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Abstract
It is emphasized that a many-worlds interpretation of quantum
theory exists only to the extent that the associated basis problem
is solved. The core basis problem is that the robust enduring states
specified by environmental decoherence effects are essentially Gaussian
wave packets that form continua of non-orthogonal states. Hence they
are not a discrete set of orthogonal basis states to which finite proba-
bilities can be assigned by the usual rules. The natural way to get an
orthogonal basis without going outside the Schroedinger dynamics is
to use the eigenstates of the reduced density matrix, and this idea is
the basis of some recent attempts by many-worlds proponents to solve
the basis problem. But these eigenstates do not enjoy the locality
and quasi-classicality properties of the states defined by environmen-
tal decoherence effects, and hence are not satisfactory preferred basis
states. This core problem needs to be addressed and resolved before
a many-worlds-type interpretation can be said to exist.
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1. Introduction.
The basis problem of the many-worlds interpretation can be efficiently in-
troduced by quoting a few exerpts from the entry ”Everett’s Relative-State
Formulation of Quantum Mechanics” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Phi-
losophy. That entry is available online[1], and elaborates on the points sum-
marized in the following passages:
Everett’s relative-state formulation of quantum mechanics is an
attempt to solve the measurement problem by dropping the col-
lapse dynamics from the standard von Neumann-Dirac theory of
quantum mechanics. The main problem with Everett’s theory is
that it is not at all clear how it is supposed to work. In particular,
while it is clear that he wanted to explain why we get determi-
nate measurement results in the context of his theory, it is unclear
how he intended to do this. There have been many attempts to
reconstruct Everett’s no-collapse theory in order to account for
the apparent determinateness of measurement outcomes. These
attempts have led to such formulations of quantum mechanics as
the many-worlds, many-minds, many-histories, and relative-fact
theories. Each of these captures part of what Everett claimed for
his theory, but each also encounters problems.
. . .
Everett’s no-collapse formulation of quantum mechanics was a
reaction to problems that arise in the standard von Neumann-
Dirac collapse theory. Everett’s proposal was to drop the collapse
postulate from the standard theory, then deduce the empirical
predictions of the standard theory as the subjective experiences
of observers who are themselves treated as physical systems de-
scribed by his theory. It is, however, unclear precisely how Ev-
erett intended for this to work. Consequently, there have been
many, mutually incompatible, attempts at trying to explain what
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he in fact had in mind.
. . .
This is what Everett says: ”We shall be able to introduce into [the
relative-state theory] systems which represent observers. Such
systems can be conceived as automatically functioning machines
(servomechanisms) possessing recording devices (memory) and
which are capable of responding to their environment. The be-
havior of these observers shall always be treated within the frame-
work of wave mechanics. Furthermore, we shall deduce the prob-
abilistic assertions of Process 1 [rule 4b] as subjective appearances
to such observers, thus placing the theory in correspondence with
experience. We are then led to the novel situation in which the
formal theory is objectively continuous and causal, while subjec-
tively discontinuous and probabilistic. While this point of view
thus shall ultimately justify our use of the statistical assertions of
the orthodox view, it enables us to do so in a logically consistent
manner, allowing for the existence of other observers.”
. . .
Everett’s goal then was to show that the memory records of an
observer as described by his no-collapse theory would match those
predicted by the standard theory with the collapse dynamics. The
main problem in understanding what Everett had in mind is in
figuring out how this correspondence between the predictions of
the two theories was supposed to work.
. . .
Many Worlds
DeWitt’s many-worlds interpretation is easily the most popular
reading of Everett. On this theory there is one world correspond-
ing to each term in the expansion of E when written in the pre-
ferred basis (there are always many ways one might write the
quantum-mechanical state of a system as the sum of vectors in
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the Hilbert space; in choosing a preferred basis, one chooses a
single set of vectors that can be used to represent a state and
thus one chooses a single preferred way of representing a state as
the sum of vectors in the Hilbert space). The theory’s preferred
basis is chosen so that each term in the expansion of E describes
a world where there is a determinate measurement record. Given
the preferred basis (surreptitiously) chosen above, E describes
two worlds: one where J (or perhaps better J1) determinately
records the measurement result ”spin up” and another where J
(or J2) determinately records ”spin down”.
DeWitt and Graham describe their reading of Everett as follows:
”[Everett’s interpretation of quantum mechanics] denies the ex-
istence of a separate classical realm and asserts that it makes
sense to talk about a state vector for the whole universe. This
state vector never collapses and hence reality as a whole is rig-
orously deterministic. This reality, which is described jointly by
the dynamical variables and the state vector, is not the reality we
customarily think of, but is a reality composed of many worlds.
By virtue of the temporal development of the dynamical variables
the state vector decomposes naturally into orthogonal vectors, re-
flecting a continual splitting of the universe into a multitude of
mutually unobservable but equally real worlds, in each of which
every good measurement has yielded a definite result and in most
of which the familiar statistical quantum laws hold.”
. . .
Perhaps more serious, in order to explain our determinate mea-
surement records, the theory requires one to choose a preferred
basis so that observers have determinate records (or better, de-
terminate experiences) in each term of the quantum-mechanical
state as expressed in this basis.
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These quotes from Barrett’s 1998 article in the Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy emphasize the central importance of specifying a basis, and
it gives many references to fill in and back up the description it gives of
the contemporary situation. However, that review does not mention David
Deutsch’s ambitious and detailed 1985 attempt[2] to solve the basis problem.
That omission is justified by the fact that Deutsch’s approach was found by
Sara Foster and Harvey Brown[3] to be marred by many logical flaws. But
in spite of these flaws, it will be useful to describe Deutsch’s 1985 attempt
in order to get an idea of the problems involved in the construction of a
many-worlds interpretation.
2. Deutsch’s 1985 Proposed Solution of the Many-Worlds Basis
Problem.
Deutsch clearly recognized that a key problem in creating a many-worlds
interpretation is the problem of defining the preferred basis. He calls it the
‘interpretation basis’, and his forty-page paper is devoted largely to task
of defining it. The other main problem is to understand how a relative
probabilility comes to be associated with each of the alternative possibilities,
all of which occur jointly and concurrently in the evolving quantum state.
Since the occurrence of any one of the possible outcomes is accompanied
by the occurrence of each of the other possible outcomes it is a problem to
understand, solely on the basis of the Schroedinger equation alone, how one
of the possibilities can be, say, a billion times less likely to appear than some
other one. I shall not delve here into this interesting problem, but will focus
on the basis problem.
Solving the basis problem seems to demand mathematically detailed rules
that specify (1), when the full reality splits into these distinct worlds, or
branches, (2), what these separate parts are, and (3), which variables asso-
ciated with these different worlds, or branches, acquire, or possess, definite
values in each such world, or branch. Deutsch recognized the three aspects
of the problem, and tried to provide well defined answers to each.
Of course, every interpretation of quantum theory that goes beyond the
4
pragmatic Copenhagen approach of merely providing a set of rules the con-
nect human experiences must provide analogous kinds of rules. But the
mathematical requirements on the structure of these rules is far more strin-
gent for a many-world theory because such a theory allows no collapse, and
everything must be determined exclusively in terms of the one basic reality,
which is the one quantum state of the universe that evolves in accordance with
the Schroedinger equation: no other process is allowed. But as Foster and
Brown emphasize, in collapse theories the specification of these rules ”need
only be within the context of some theory, not necessarily quantum theory.”
The encompassing theory could allow, for example, as von Neumann’s the-
ory does, experiential realities to enter dynamically into the determination
of the basis, instead of being mere consequences of some choice of basis that
is itself wholly determined by the unitary evolution of the quantum state in
accordance with the Schroedinger equation.
Deutsch recognized and stressed the critical importance of this basis prob-
lem, and made a determined effort to solved it:
”The remedy which I propose in section 7 is that an extra rule be ap-
pended to the quantum formalism, specifying how the interpretational basis
depends at each instant of time on the physical state and dynamical evolution
of a quantum system.”
The first problem that he tries to resolve is what he calls ”the notorious
difficulty of specifying the preferred instants t . . . when a measurement is
completed.” These instants must be defined solely in terms of (1), the single
evolving state of the universe, which evolves always via the Schroedinger
equation, and (2), the law that governs this continuous unitary evolution.
The second problem is that at each of these distinct “instants of splitting”
the unified actual universe must be decomposed in a specified way into two
systems, the ‘observed system’ and ‘observing system’. Hence the rule that
defines how the unified universe is to be split at that instant into these two
special parts must be specified in terms solely of the state vector itself and
its law of evolution.
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The third problem is to define for each instant a set of evolving basis
vectors so that the state of the universe can at every instant be decomposed
in a unique way into a sum of component vectors that can be associated with
different worlds, or branches of reality, that possess definite values for the
quantities “measured” at each instant of splitting.
Deutsch solves the problem of dividing the unified physical world into the
well defined physical parts that will ultimately acquire ‘possessed values’ by
restricting his considerations to a model world that has only a finite set of
states, and dividing this set of states in some way into subsystems each having
a ‘prime number’ of states in each subsystem. One evident problem with that
approach is the essential role played by this finiteness assumption and the
‘prime factor’ rule: Deutsch does not indicate how this ‘prime number rule’,
which is purely kinematic (it does not involve the equations of motion) will
carry over to real systems, in which every particle carries with it an infinite
number of states, and in particular to the systems that carry the stored
memories associated with our experiences. These systems are presumably
made of many particles, and are strongly dependent on the dynamics.
Once the separation of the universe into the observed and observing sys-
tems is made, Deutsch specifies the instant at which the splitting occurs to
be essentially the instant at which the interaction between observed and ob-
serving system vanishes. But the ubiquitous tails of real systems would make
that condition difficult to satisfy in the physical universe.
Once the instants of splittings are fixed, and the separation of the uni-
verse at each of these instants into the observed and observing system is
specified, one needs to define, for every instant of time, the preferred basis.
This basis defines the decomposition of the quantum state of the universe
into a unique sum of vectors each of which is parallel to one of the vectors in
the preferred set of basis vectors. Each of these particular component vec-
tors is supposed to correspond to a separate world, or branch of the universe.
The decomposition must be such that if a probability is assigned to each
such world in accordance with usual rule, which equates it to the square of
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the length of the corresponding vector, then the expectation values of certain
special quantities, namely those represented by operators whose eigenvectors
are these basis vectors, are required to agree with the general quantum me-
chanical rule for expectation values. This is how Deutsch proposed to endow
the evolving non-collapsing quantum universe with some definite outcomes
in a way concordant with the quantum probability rules: each individual
branch would have ‘possessed values’ appropriate to that branch, and the
branch would be given the appropriate statistical weight. But the entire
construction depends crucially on the idea that a particular well-defined set
of preferred basis states is specified by the evolving non-collapsing quantum
state of the universe.
Deutsch tried to deduce the structure of this preferred basis set by im-
posing the requirement of no-faster-than-light-influence, but his argument is,
as was correctly noted by Foster and Brown, logically flawed. The primary
condition on a many-world interpretation is that there be no actual collapse:
the values associated with the preferred basis vectors are supposed to be
”possessed” by the systems, or to exist within nature, without there being
any collapse that actually eliminates the cross terms. However, the crucial
equation (Eq. 50) that gives the structure of the preferred basis does not
follow from Deutsch’s argument, insofar as the no collapse condition is main-
tained. The result would follow if the appropriate collapse were to occur.
That is, Deutsch’s proof would be valid if he were trying to define the pre-
ferred basis in the context of a collapse-type theory, but it is not valid in the
many-worlds context. This error is not just a small slip-up that can by fixed
by a minor correction. Foster and Brown emphasize this problem, and also
problems with the existence and uniqueness of solutions to the conditions
that Deutsch proposes. Michael Lockwood reports in his 1989 book Mind,
Brain, and the Quantum, (p. 236) that Deutsch ”has failed so far to find any
plausible way to meet Foster and Brown’s objections.” Lockwood’s own solu-
tion brings in ”Mind” in an important way, and is thus not a ”Many-Worlds
Interpretation” in the DeWitt-Deutsch sense of this term.
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3. The Core Basis Problem
This section identifies the core basis problem.
The essential point is that if the universe has been evolving since the big
bang in accordance with the Schroedinger equation, then it must by now
be an amorphous structure in which every device is a smeared-out cloud of
a continuum of different possibilities. Indeed, the planet earth would not
have a well defined location, nor would the rivers and oceans, nor the cities
built on their banks. Due to the uncertainty principle, each particle would
have had a tendency to spread out. Thus various particles with various mo-
menta would have been able to combine and condense in myriads of ways
into bound structures, including measuring devices, whose centers, orien-
tations, and fine details would necessarily be smeared out over continua of
possibilities. The quantum state would be, to first order, a superposition of a
continuum of slightly differing classical-type worlds with, in particular, each
measuring device, and also each observing brain, smeared out over a con-
tinuum of locations, orientations, and detailed structures. But the normal
rules for extracting well defined probabilities from a quantum state require
the specification, or singling out, of a discrete set (i.e., a denumerable set)
of orthogonal subspaces, one for each of a set of alternative possible experi-
entially distinguishable observations. But how can a particular discrete set
of orthogonal subspaces be picked out from an amorphous continuum by the
action of the Schroedinger equation alone?
For example, if one has in the wave function of the universe, in addition
to the contribution from some particular wave function of a Stern-Gerlach
device, also contributions from all slight deviations of this wave functions
from this original form, then this collection, if no one deviation is singled
out from its immediate neighbors in some way, defines no proper subspace:
any collection of vectors in a full neighborhood of a vector spans the entire
vector space. This fact poses a problem in principle for any deduction of
probabilities from the Schroedinger dynamics alone: how can a specific set
discrete orthonormal subspaces be specified by the continuous action of the
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Schroedinger equation on a continuously smeared out amorphous state?
The essential role of the human participant/observer in the orthodox
Copenhagen interpretation is to pick out a particular discrete subspace (or a
particular set of orthogonal subspaces) from a continuum of logically possible
alternatives. He is able to do this by not being part of the universe that
evolves via the Schroedinger equation. The fact that the participant/observer
who chooses the experiment, and observes the outcome, stands, in this sense,
outside the quantum universe, but acts upon it and observes it, is a key
logical aspect of the orthodox interpretation. In the von Neumann version
this choice is achieved by the notorious “process I”, which likewise is not
determined by the unitary Schroedinger process, but specifies a particular
way of dividing the full Hilbert space into a denumerable set of orthogonal
subspaces.
Any theory that proposes that the entire universe be controlled by the
Schroedinger equation alone must explain how that continuous unitary pro-
cess can pick out a particular denumerable set of ‘observable’ orthogonal
subspaces with nonzero probabilities, in such a way that these nonzero prob-
abilities become associated with empirically experienced alternatives.
Most contemporary efforts to solve the “measurement” problem in quan-
tum theory rest heavily upon “environmental decoherence effects.” One of
the effects of this interaction of a system with its environment is to convert
what would otherwise be a wave packet that can extend coherently over a
large distance, in various dimensions, into what is essentially a mixture of
narrow gaussian wave packets. The mixture is, essentially, a sum over a
continuum of displaced narrow Gaussians in the variable associated with the
wave function [4]. These Gaussian states are dynamically robust under the
effects of interactions with the environment, and have classical-type proper-
ties that make then good candidates for the states that correspond to definite
experiences.
Specifically, the effect of environmental decoherence is to reduce a typical
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state Ψ(x′) to a mixture of states of the form
Ψx(x
′) = N(x) exp−a2(x′ − x)2, (3.1)
where N(x) is a weight factor, and the subscript x, which labels the center-
point, or peak, of the Gaussian wave packet, ranges over a continuum of
values. None of these states is orthogonal to any other. (Here, to make the
idea clear, I am exhibiting only one single continuum variable, x. But all
position-type variables would be affected in a similar way.)
This decoherence mechanism eliminates certain interference effects, but
it does not solve the basis problem. There will be a continuum of these
Gaussians, (3.1), and they overlap: i.e., they are not orthogonal. As before,
if one takes a set of these state consisting of one of them together with those
displaced from it by a distance ∆x less than any epsilon greater than zero
then this set will included a continuum of states that span a large part of the
Hilbert space of functions of the variable x′ (See [5]). Since no one of this
continuum of states is singled out from the rest by the Schroedinger dynamics,
and they jointly span a large part of the Hilbert space in question, one does
not immediately obtain from the Schroedinger dynamics plus decoherence
the needed denumerable set {Pi} of orthogonal projection operators, or the
denumerable set of orthogonal subspaces that they specify.
A natural candidate for the needed denumerable set of orthogonal sub-
spaces associated with the continuum of states (3.1) is the set of subspaces
defined by the different eigenvalues of the reduced density matrix associated
with that mixture of states. That candidate is, in fact, the one chosen by
Deutsch in his 1985 paper. However, that choice is not satifactory. One
wants states that are highly localized, like a classical state. But the eigen-
states of the reduced density matrix associated with the states (3.1), i.e., the
eigenstates of a density matrix of the form
< x′|ρr|x′′ >= N(x′, x′′) exp−a2(x′ − x′′)2/2, (3.2)
with a slowly changing normalization function N(x′, x′′), are spread out over
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large distances, rather than being compressed into small regions, like the
states (3.1) themselves are. Taking the eigenstates of the reduced density
matrix goes in the wrong direction. Because this natural choice is unsatis-
factory one is left with the core problem of how to specify, without appeal to
any process except the continuous Schroedinger unitary evolution, the denu-
merable set of orthogonal subspaces that are to be associated with definite
observed values and finite probabilities.
4. Deutsch’s Multiverse Proposal
Recently Deutsch has put forward a new many-worlds concept labelled
the ”multiverse”. In the popular account given in his book The Fabric of
Reality the multiverse would appear to be a collection of classical-type uni-
verses each one similar to the single quasi-classical world introduced by David
Bohm in his famous pilot-wave model. But that cannot be Deutsch’s real
meaning because Bohm’s classical-type universe is governed, in part, by non-
local forces, and a key virtue of the many-worlds approach, often emphasized
by Deutsch, is that it does not involve or entail any kind of faster-than-light
transfer of information.
In his recent paper The Structure of the Multiverse [6] Deutsch gives a
more detailed glimpse into his thinking, and he emphasizes at the outset the
existence of the basis problem, and the demand for no faster-than-light trans-
fer of information. Deutsch’s new proposal involves different quasi-classical
aspects of the quantum universe that persist and evolve in parallel over fi-
nite temporal intervals but can eventually recombine to produce quantum
interference effects. This idea is much closer to standard ideas than Bohm’s
model, in which the quasi-classical world persists for all time, and quantum
interference effects are explained by a special nonlocal force, rather than by
the merging of previously distinct quasi-classical components.
In his new work Deutsch again emphasizes the basis problem, and I think
it is fair to say that a many-worlds interpretation is not defined until it solves
in principle the basis problem. Indeed, the basis problem is the problem that
any interpretation of quantum theory must resolve in some way. Thus the
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central idea of the Copenhagen interpretation was to imbed the quantum
system in a larger system that specifies the preferred basis by bringing in
”measuring devices” that are set in place by a classically conceived process.
In von Neumann’s formulation there is the infamous “Process I”, which like-
wise lies outside the process governed by the Schroedinger equation. The key
challenge that must be met by a satisfactory many-worlds interpretation is
to solve this basis problem within quantum theory itself, without bringing in
any outside dynamical process.
Deutsch’s program is to create a satisfactory many-worlds-type theory
by considering nature to be a quantum computer. Deutsch cites Feynman’s
paper[7] on quantum mechanical computers. In this paper Feynman says:
Of course, there are external things involved in making the mea-
surements and determining all this [setting up the computer],
which are not parts of our computer. Surely a computer has
eventually to be in interaction with the external world, both for
putting in data and for taking it out.
Here Feynman is following the orthodox idea that a computer is a quantum
system, and as such must be considered imbedded in a larger world in which
we prepare initial conditions, including the structures of all devices, and
then extract outcomes. Deutsch’s problem is, accordingly, to show how by
considering the whole universe to be a quantum computer one can solve this
heretofore unresolved interpretational problem that has beset those trying to
create a satisfactory many-worlds theory.
To emphasize the problems that others have encountered I quote some
passsages from Zurek’s 1998 review[8] of the status of attempts to use en-
vironmental decoherence (abetted, if helpful, by coherent histories) to solve
the interpretational problem.
It will be emphasized that while significant progress has been
made . . . much remains to be done on several fronts which all
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have implications on the overarching question of interpretation.
. . .
Thus, while what follows is perhaps the most complete discussion
of the interpretation implied by decoherence, it is still only a re-
port of partial progress.
. . .
The advantages of Everett’s original vision was to reinstate quan-
tum theory as a key tool in search of its own interpretation. The
disadvantages (which were realized only some years later, after
the original proposal became more widely known) include (i) the
ambiguity in what constitutes the branches . . . (ii) re-emergence
of the questions about the origin of probabilities . . . (iii) it was
never clear how to reconcile unique experiences of observers with
the multitude of alternatives present in the MWI wave function.
. . .
The interpretation based on ideas of decoherence and [environ-
mentally induced] einselection has not really been spelled out to
date in any detail. I have made a few half-hearted attempts in this
direction, but, frankly, I was hoping to postpone this task, since
the ultimate questions tend to involve such ‘anthropic’ attributes
of the ‘observership’ as ‘perception’, ‘awareness’ or ‘conscious-
ness’,
. . .
Einselection chooses a preferred basis . . . I˙t will often turn out
that it is overcomplete. Its states may not be orthogonal, and,
hence, they could never follow from the diagonalization of the
density matrix.
These quotations show that Zurek recognizes the core continuum problem
that I have been describing.
How then does Deutsch deal with this basic problem, which is that a
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quantum universe evolving via the Schroedinger equation does not seem to
be able to pick out a discrete set of preferred directions (or subspaces) in
Hilbert space that specify quasi-classical properties that can be assigned
definite “possessed values” with well defined probabilities.
His approach is first to define, in terms of his quantum-computer formu-
lation of quantum theory, certain mathematical requirements for a portion of
the full quantum computer to be ‘behaving classically’. These requirements
depend upon certain directions in Hilbert space being singled out as the ones
that correspond to ‘possessed values’. Those special directions are not spec-
ified beforehand, but are defined by the dynamics, in the sense that if with
some choice of these directions a certain system behaves classically then these
special directions are picked out by that classicality condition itself. Thus
the preferred basis is defined dynamically, by a classicality condition.
This is eminently reasonable, as far as it goes. By it does not address
the basic continuum problem, which would be to show that the classicality
conditions specify, at each moment at which “possessed values” are defined,
a denumerable set of mutually orthogonal subspaces within the full amor-
phous many-worlds universe, in which there will be continua of neighboring
environmentally robust configurations in which the detectors that define the
preferred axes of his qubit-measuring devices are slightly re-oriented. The
basic problem is to get out of the continua specified by the Schroedinger dy-
namics plus environmental decoherence the denumerable sets of orthogonal
subspaces needed to make the probability formulas work. This core issue was
not addressed.
5. Zurek’s Approach and Records
Deutsch’s multiverse theory is in general accord with Zurek’s approach[8],
and in the end Deutsch appeals to Zurek’s arguments to support the idea
that the ‘classically behaving’ aspects of the quantum universe will explain
the ‘classical world’ in which we live and act.
Zurek’s treatment is wrapped up, as it should be, with his treatment of
probabilities. In this connection he says:
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A true ‘frequency’ with a classical interpretation cannot be de-
fined at a level which does not allow ‘events’—quantum evolution
which leads to objectively existing states—to be associated with
the individual members of that ensemble. . . . The reduced den-
sity matrix ρ, which emerges following the interaction with the
environment, and a partial trace will always be diagonal in the
same basis of einselected pointer states {|i >}. These states help
define elementary ‘events’. Probabilities of such events can be
inferred from their coefficients in ρ, which have the desired ‘Born
rule’ form.
Zurek’s discussions of ‘existing’ values and probabilities rests on this model,
in which the reduced density matrix is diagonal in the same states that
specify the values that are supposed to ‘exist’. But that model must come
to grips with the continuum problem, which is emphasized elsewhere in his
paper by statements such as:
In that case [which in fact arises in the quantum field theoretic
treatment of the measurement process] the states which are most
immune to decoherence in the long run turn out to be . . . Gaus-
sians. . . . Hence coherent states [which are Gaussians] are favored
by decoherence. . . . Einselection chooses a preferred basis in the
Hilbert space in recognition of its predictability. That basis will
be determined by the dynamics of the open system in the pres-
ence of environmental monitoring. It will often turn out that it is
over complete. [This is precisely the case for the Gaussian’s men-
tioned above.] Its states may not be orthogonal, and, hence, they
would never follow from diagonalization of the density matrix.
Thus Zurek stresses that the robust Gaussian-type states picked out by
environmental decoherence belong to a continuum of non-orthogonal states,
and hence do not generally define a denumerable set of orthogonal subspaces,
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and are not the basis states defined by diagonalization of the reduced density
matrix. This leads to the question: Does the diagonalization of the reduced
density matrix yield physically appropriate basis states?
A partial answer this question is obtained by noting that for constant ρ
the reduced density matrix is essentially
< x′|ρr|x′′ >=
√
2/pi
∫
dx exp−(x′ − x)2 < x′|ρ|x′′ > exp−(x′′ − x)2 (5.1)
= exp−(1/2)(x′ − x′′)2 < x′|ρ|x′′ > (5.2)
The eigenfunctions of this ρr are the functions exp−ipx, which are spread
uniformly over all space. (To get normalized functions one can formulate the
problem with periodicity over a large interval.) Thus in this simplest case
the diagonalization effectively undoes the localization effect produced by the
decoherence: it does not produce localized, robust, quasi-classical states.
Zurek emphasizes, as did Everett, the critical importance of records. A
record is typically stored in the state of a relative coordinate in which the
potential energy has two deep, well separated wells. It has been suggested,
in this case, that if the energy gap between, on the one hand, the two almost
degenerate states of lowest energy and, on the other hand, the higher-energy
double-well energy eigenstates is large compared to the energy of the per-
tinent environmental states then those higher-energy states can be ignored.
The problem then reduces to one in which only the two lowest energy states
are considered, together with the states of the environment. The reduced
density matrix would be a 2× 2 matrix that, apart from an overall normal-
ization factor, has (1 + b, 1 − b) on the diagonal and the value a in the two
off diagonal slots, with a generally much smaller than b. The two eigenstates
of this reduced density matrix will, up to corrections of order a/b, each be
concentrated in one well or the other, which is the desired result.
This approximation is essentially equivalent to concentrating the coordi-
nate space wave function at two points, and neglecting the connecting net-
work of coordinate-space points. However, there is a qualitative difference
between setting the other elements to zero and taking them to be very tiny.
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To illustrate this point consider first the easily solvable case of the 3× 3
matrix with diagonal elements (1, c, 1), next-to-diagonal elements a > 0, and
zeros in the two corners. The eigenvalues are (1, (1+ c+ r)/2, (1+ c− r)/2),
with r =
√
((1− c)2+8a2), and the eigenvectors are (1, 0,−1), (1, s+, 1) and
(1, s−, 1), with s± = 4a/(1−c±r). For a and c very small, but nonzero, one
has s+ ≈ 2a, and s− ≈ −1/a, and hence the triad of eigenstates is unlike
the triad of localized states
(1, 0, 0), (0, 1, 0), (0, 0, 1), (5.4)
which are possible eigenstates for a = 0.
This example illustrates the general fact that for almost any matrix that
is symmetric along the diagonal [i.e., with < i|M |j >=< −i|M | − j >, with
the states labeled (n, n− 1, ...,−n)], and that has < i|M |j > 6= 0 for all pairs
(i.j), all of the eigenstatates will be either symmetrical or anti-symmetrical:
this property of our 3 × 3 example carries over to the general symmetric
(along the diagonal direction) case. [One can prove this result by making
the anzatz that the eigenstates are either symmetric or antisymmetric [i.e.,
< i|φ >= ± < −i|φ >] and noting that the equations for the symmetric and
antisymmetric eigenvectors have n+1 and n solutions, respectively, and that
equations for the symmetric and antisymmetric eigenfunctions are different.]
This result for the exactly symmetrical case carries over to the nearby
almost-symmetrical cases by analyticity. But the general rule for specifying
the preferred basis must cover the special case of the nearly symmetrical
potential wells. Since the diagonalization of the reduced density matrix does
not lead to the correct (i.e., localized) eigenstates in the nearly symmetrical
cases it cannot be the correct general rule. Thus although the diagonalization
of the reduced density matrix does define a denumerable set of orthogonal
subspaces, it cannot always do the job that the participant/observer does
in orthodox Copenhagen quantum theory, and that “process I” does in von
Neumann quantum theory, which is to pick out a discrete set of orthogonal
subspaces that are associable with alternative possible experiences.
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The example of the nearly symmetrical case shows that the diagonal-
ization of a reduced density matrix does not define the needed discrete or-
thogonal states. Robustness is the essential quality. More specifically, it
is the quality of a “record” not only to endure, but to be creatable, re-
producible, and able to control essentially classical behaviors without being
appreciably degraded.[9] The effects of the environment are important in this
connection, because they destroy the possibility that certain states could be
records. Thus environmental decoherence does have powerful effects. But
that does not solve the problem of extracting, by means of the Schroedinger
equation alone — from the amorphous state that is created by the evolu-
tion of the big bang state via the Schroedinger equation — a discrete set of
orthogonal basis record-type states. In this Schroedinger state every atom,
and conglomeration of atoms, will be a smeared out continuum. The essen-
tial reason why the founders had to regard the quantum system as being
imbedded in an enveloping process, and why von Neumann had to introduce
his Process I, was to solve this problem of specifying a discrete basis for
the probability computations associated with our apparently discrete (Yes
or No) experiences, when the Schroedinger equation generates continuous
evolution of an ever-amorphous state. Specifing a discrete set of basis states
solely from the continuous structure generated by the Schroedinger equation
would appear to be an impossible feat. In any case, no claim to having con-
structed a rationally coherent many worlds/minds formulation of quantum
theory is justified unless this discrete basis problem is clearly recognized and
adequately resolved.
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